

INFO FROM SR/CE DOSSIER (OLD 5 x 8 CARDS) ON HARRO SCHULZE-BOYSEN

SCHULZE-BOYSEN, Harro (Oblt.)

Sov. Mil. Intell.
Agent Net EQUAL
German

- CHORO
- GEORGE

BORN: 2 Sep 1909

NATIONALITY: German

FAMILY: Father Erich Edgar SCHULZE
Mother
Relative Elsa BOYSEN
Wife Libertas

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

LANGUAGES: Swedish, English, French, German; 1939 learned Russian

ADDRESSES: Berlin-Charlottenburg, Waitstrasse 2
Berlin-Charlottenburg, Altenburger Allee 119

POL. AFFILIATION: Well-known Communist since 1933

BACKGROUND; COMMUNIST ACTIVITY:

Prior to 1933 was a member of the Jungdeutsche Orden. In 1933, Harro was arrested; his family succeeded in procuring his release.

According to HABECKER, in the pre-war days, GEIRING who was a friend of the family used to visit the house of Harro's parents in law; hence his introduction into the Luftwaffe.

From 1936 on, SCHULZE-BOYSEN was employed at the German Air Ministry; he was at the same time the head of a Communist discussion group in Berlin. He was later employed at the L.C. Staff on the Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab.

According to HABECKER, he had been a Communist for years. He and HARNACK according to HABECKER, had sent reports to the Soviet Embassy in Berlin or to the M.A. This report sending stopped, according to HABECKER, in 1938 as the a/n feared discovery. HABECKER does not go into the nature of these reports.

At the Ministry, Harro had connections with the German preparation against the Red Government in Spain. The R.K. Report II states that he sent to Moscow via Gisela von POELLNITZ a memo on this subject. This was in 1936.

In 1937, Harro seems to have temporarily become extinct as a source of info exploited through the KPD. According to the British, while the reason for this interruption is not known possibly, it was the result of some successful Commie enterprise by the Gestapo.

In April 1939, SUKOLOV visited Berlin on instructions from Moscow in order to revive the SCHULZE-BOYSEN as a source and to arrange communication with him by courier. According to the British, SUKOLOV's posting to Brussels in July 1939 was most probably made in order to provide a reception point for Harro's information and a means of relaying info from Belgium to Moscow. It appears that SUKOLOV had some difficulty in rousing him to his new task.

SCHULZE-BOYSEN, according to various posthumous accounts of his career, was very much an idealist or what the Germans call a "drawing-room" Communist. He may have found, according to the British, a direct approach by a Soviet Intelligence agent somewhat shocking in comparison with his unofficial contributions to the Communist Party Intelligence in 1936. However, he rose to the occasion and a courier link was established between him in Berlin and, presumably, SUKOLOV in Brussels. The exact date when SCHULZE-BOYSEN's supply of info began in 1939 is not known, but considering his position in the Air Ministry, it is likely to have been of high value. For this reason, SUKOLOV may have arranged in October 1939 for the emergency link from Belgium through the Dutch CP W/T to Moscow.

RECRUITMENT BY SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:

Shortly before the outbreak of the war, Harro was recruited as an espionage agent for Soviet Military Intelligence by Alexander ERDBERG to whom he was introduced by HARNACK.

ESPIONAGE:

Harro was told by ERDBERG to form an espionage network. Shortly before ERDBERG left Berlin in May of June 1941, he supplied both HARNACK and SCHULZE-BOYSEN with W/T sets for the groups which they were to run. Neither W/T worked and Harro continued to send his intelligence by courier to Belgium.

Gradually, Harro developed from the status of a source to that of a group leader, and in his prime is said to have owned a network with connections in Prague, Ansbach, Saxony, Thuringia, Magdeburg, and Hamburg.

PERSONS RECRUITED BY SCHULZE-BOYSEN:

By giving lectures at the Hochschule fuer Polit., Harro was able to recruit useful students. Among these students were HEILMANN.

ESPIONAGE CONTACTS:

ERDBERG - was recruited by ERDBERG.

COPPI, Hans - according to HAECKER, COPPI was probably introduced to SCHULZE-BOYSEN by Walter HUSEMANN.

INFORMATION SENT TO THE SOVIETS:

According to HABECKER, Harro's reports included Air Force losses in the Polish campaign, monthly aircraft production figures, oil reserve figures. According to HABECKER, the loss of a complete convoy of 13 tankers between Italy and North Africa, was put down to SCHULZE-BOYSEN's account.

CONTACT WITH SUKOLOV @ KENT IN 1941:

The war had stopped SCHULZE-BOYSEN's means of communication with Moscow. SUKOLOV @ KENT in 1941 in Belgium was directed, among other things, by Moscow to get this report sending in motion again, either by putting agents on to an existing radio network or by giving them their own W/T set.

SUKOLOV went to Germany in the fall of 1941. In the fall of 1941, a W/T set changed hands in the Reichskanzlerplatz U-Bahn Station. The set was dropped and damaged. SUKOLOV was in touch with Harro and visited him in Berlin in the fall of 41. While Harro was waiting for another set, he sent his reports by courier, according to HABECKER, to Paris; it is more likely that they went to Belgium. Nothing is known about the courier or couriers. Frans or Germaine SCHNEIDER might have performed this duty.

ARREST AND SENTENCE: Was arrested on 30 August 1942.

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY UP TO END 1940:

Up to his recruitment, SCHULZE-BOYSEN served only as a source of information. It was not until 1941 that he became an operator as well as a source.

Sometime prior to 1936, Harro, by that time employed at the German Air Ministry, had become a source of information for the Soviet Intelligence Service, on an indirect line through the German CP.

In 1936 he produced intelligence on German preparations against the Red Government in Spain. This info he passed to the AM Apparat, or Secret Mil. Section of the German CP. This was handed on in turn through Gisela von FERNLITZ to a contact in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin.

From there the intell was passed to Moscow. It is not clear whether the info went to Sov. Mil. Intell. or to the GUGB. According to the British it might be expected that the GUGB would have first claim on a strictly Communist source; on the other hand, the British advise, that Sov. Mil. Intell. may have tapped the AM Apparat just as they seem to have secured a hold on the BB Apparat in France by means of ROBINSON.

REFERENCES:

R.K. REPORT II
R.K. REPORT III, p. 8, 9
HABECKER INTERROGATION, WELA-681, March 1948
ROEDER INTERROGATION, 26282, MGKA-1441, 9 June 1948